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ABSTRACT
Pipelines transport millions of barrels of petroleum products every day. These systems have
significant safety concerns. The BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, while concerned with oil and
gas extraction rather than distribution, shares many of the same safety and reliability issues as
distribution systems, and demonstrates the significant potential for major disasters in the pipeline
industry. In this work, a research study is being conducted to further understanding of the role of
operators in the management of alarm systems and to measure the performance of operators in
handling abnormal situations like pressure loss, liquid inflow/outflow variation and alarm floods.
In an Abnormal Situation Management (ASM) consortium traditional interface study, improving
the human machine interaction (HMI) in designing the operator’s user interface resulted in 41%
less time for the operators to deal with events like leaks, power failures, equipment malfunction
and equipment failures in an unstable plant (Errington, 2005). To evaluate the impact of different
alarm rates and interfaces on operator performance, a liquid pipeline simulation experiment of 1
hour was developed and the operators ran the experiment repeatedly at different alarm levels:
chronological and categorical displays with the alarm rate of 15 alarms per 10 minutes
(chronological display only), 20, 25 and 30 alarms per 10 minutes (the last rate with the
categorical display only). Twenty five pipeline and refinery operators participated in this
research, and the performance of operators was measured in terms of acknowledgement time,
response time and the accuracy of response. Results showed that the operator’s performance in
terms of response time was significantly different between 25 and 30 alarm rates. Experiments to
compare the response times in both the alarm windows did not show significant difference
statistically, but the means were better in categorical display. This study will be useful in
developing new standards on operator performance.

vii

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Petroleum products are often transported by pipelines and oil tankers. The largest volume
products transported are oil and gasoline (petrol). The American Petroleum Institute (API)
divides the petroleum industry into five sectors: Upstream, Downstream, Pipeline, Marine and
Service & Supply. This work focuses primarily on downstream and pipeline systems.
Today there is a major concern for liquid and gas pipeline safety, and measures have been
taken to understand the role of the human operator in the alarm management system to ensure the
safe transportation of hazardous liquids. Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)
systems are used to collect data from pipeline sensors and human controllers monitor the data
from remote sites for operational and safety problems. The petroleum industry has lost billions of
dollars in major pipeline accidents because of delays in finding problems and taking appropriate
corrective action (NTSB, 2005). For example, in an accident in Chalk Point, Maryland where a
pipeline ruptured at a buckle in the pipe, a leak was not noticed for 7 hours (NTSB, 2005). The
safety board concluded that lack of adequate pipeline monitoring practices delayed discovery of
the leak.
A study conducted in petrochemical and refining operations by Butikofer observed the
sources attributed to cause of accidents include operator and maintenance errors (41%),
equipment and design failures (41%), inadequate procedures (11%), inadequate or improper
inspection (5%) and other (2%) (Formosa Plastics, 2007). Human errors can be caused by many
variables, such as poor interface design, operator experience, communication problems, and shift
fatigue.
In ASM’s operator's interface study, correcting Human Machine Interaction (HMI) issues
in designing the operator’s interface resulted in 41% faster response to the abnormal situation
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(Errington, 2005). Some of the HMI issues included color, alpha- numeric and text presentation,
audible annunciation which should be well thought-out when designing the graphics display.

1.1 Problem Statement
The International Society of Automation (ISA) TR18.05-2010 standard (ISA, 2010) reports on
alarm system monitoring, assessment, and auditing stated alarm performance metrics based on
data collected over 30 days. According to the report, the maximum manageable alarms per hour
per operator are around 12, and around 300 alarms per day and most of the required operator
actions during an upset (unstable plant and required intervention of the human) are time critical.
Information overflow and alarm flooding often confuse the operator, and important alarms may
be missed because they are obscured by hundreds of other alarms. Operators usually work for 8,
10 or 12 hour shifts and concentration levels are unlikely to be the same throughout the entire
shift. Alarm rates, operator interface design, fatigue and environment have impact on the
operator’s performance and his/her accuracy to respond to the situation. There is a need to design
the alarm system considering human factors, so that the operator can always effectively keep
focus on plant operations throughout the entire shift. Some of the issues encountered by
operators include (Shahriari, 2006) :
•

Lack of the optimum number of operators and insufficient screen space.

•

External disturbances such as phone calls and the gathering of people around the control
panel that may increase the confusion even more.

•

Between various display modes, no overall standard is maintained leading to confusion in
presentation, where messages and graphics vary from one computer display to another.

•

No online help or guidance is available to assist the operators.

2

1.2 Objectives
The NTSB recommended improvement in alarm management, training and human machine
interface design (NTSB, 2005). The design issues in alarm management include displaying the
detailed information of where the problem is, and providing suggestive information to the
operator in rectifying the problem.
The objectives of the thesis are to:
•

Evaluate different alarm rates

and its impact on operator performance

(acknowledgement time, response time, accuracy of response, and successful
completion). Accuracy of response evaluates the operator’s ability to carry out
corrective action in the correct sequence.
•

Determine the effect of alarms displayed in categorical and chronological alarm
displays on the operator's performance. Three experiments will use categorical
display and another three experiments will use chronological display of alarms. Most
of the petro chemical companies use chronological display of alarms, so in this
project a comparison is made between the alarm displays for given alarm rates.

3

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Human Factors Analysis
In order to prevent accidents caused by human error in the pipeline industry, it is important to
improve the safety measures in the operator’s workplace and improve the effectiveness of human
interface interaction. A good work environment will improve the operator’s efficiency and the
abnormal situations can be handled effectively. Eighty percent of the pipeline accidents are
caused by human error as was noted in several studies conducted by ASM consortium, API and
other similar organizations. Human error can be associated with poor operator interface design,
operator experience, workload or shift fatigue, and lack of communication. Operators may not
experience the same set of problems (like equipment failure, leak and power trip) whenever they
have an abnormal situation and so it is important to accumulate the operator’s knowledge from
previously encountered abnormal situations in order to help the operator make a decision and
avoid the wrong action for a known problem (Nimmo, 2002).
Operator must understand the characteristics of a process and adapt to the situation
accordingly and it will definitely affect the safety of the control system. Operator’s usability
issues should be considered while designing the interface to improve their performance. The
process designers are of the opinion that they can reduce or even eliminate the human error if
they can, “remove human from the loop” and think of automation as the most convenient
alternative for increasing system reliability (Meshkati, 2006). But according to meshkati, human
operators will have to remain in charge to monitor and control the day-to-day operations despite
the advancements in computer technology. Meshkati states that the reason is that the process
designers cannot anticipate all possible scenarios of failure, and cannot automate the system to
handle every possible abnormal event and they cannot provide pre-planned safety measures.
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2.2 Interface Design
During emergency situation, the operator gets a lot of feedback from the SCADA system and the
operator has to focus on so many variables at the same time. Figure 1 is an example of the LCD
panels operators have to focus during emergency operations and it require a mental effort to sort,
integrate, process through the available data to operate on plant situation (Nimmo, 2010).
Nimmo states that the number of alarms we see in the process industry now is because of lack of
leadership at that particular plant (Nimmo, 2011). Nimmo pointed out that while designing the
alarms, process engineers specify process alarms, equipment engineers add up alarms for the
protection of the machinery, control engineers specify the alarms while installing the distributed
control system, operators point out some alarms based on how they felt using the HMI. In this
process the number of alarms raised to 14000 DCS alarms (in general) from 140 physical alarms.
Nimmo is of the opinion that the companies don’t really understand the importance of alarm
management until a disaster happens.

Figure 1: LCD panel example
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2.2.1 Elements of the Interface
Many information processing technologies and new input-output devices, are now available in
the commercial market and the invention of new types of human interface for supporting our
daily work are developed (Preece, 2002). However, “the cognitive ability of humans has not
varied, but is almost at the same level as that of prehistoric man” (Yoshikawa, 2003).
There are several issues while designing the Human Machine Interactions and few which
have a direct impact include color, alpha- numeric and text presentation and quality of the
audible, if provided (Errington, 2006). These issues should be well thought-out when designing
the interface
‘Direct manipulation’ describes interactive systems where the user is provided with
familiar methods of interaction (Preece, 2002). For example, the floppy icon we see in Microsoft
Word is a common representation of a save option. The operator can easily understand and
quickly find the object if its graphic representation closely resembles the physical world objects.
In the operator’s perspective, during emergency they must concentrate on many variables and if
they cannot find the required tool or button quickly, the reaction times increase and can have a
negative impact on decision making and taking action to prevent accidents or loss of production.
Some key recommendations of a graphical interface study conducted in the pipeline
industry (Errington, 2006) include:
•

Multi-windowing with controlled window management to minimize display overlays.

•

Multi-level, simultaneous views of increasing plant detail.

•

Automated display invocation through pre-configured display associations for assisted,
task-relevant navigation.

•

Tabbed navigation within a display level.
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•

Access to online information

•

Limited color-coding, limited 3-D objects and simple/effective symbols

2.2.2 Degree of Fidelity
Graphical display and text console methods are available to interact with the operator interface
(Preece, 2002). While designing the interface considering the above methods three specific
details must be considered. They are:
•

Operator’s needs.

•

Operator’s goals.

•

Operator’s skills and knowledge.
An interface design should be operator centered and the information provided in the form

of alarm messages and the control parameters defined should be easily understood by the
operator. An easy navigation through the interface screens should be designed, so that the
operator can manage and handle the workload during an emergency situation. The controls and
devices whose data is monitored through the user interface can be designed to resemble the
behavior of real world equipment and devices and it helps the operators to better understand the
dynamics of the plant processes. A NTSB safety study conducted on 13 pipeline accidents from
1992 to 2004 concluded that some aspect of the SCADA system contributed to the severity of the
accident in 10 of those accidents (NTSB, 2005).

2.3 Operator Training and Responsibilities
Operators handle many alarms which include nuisance alarms and information messages along
with priority alarms. During an emergency situation, it is very difficult to predict where and
when a pipeline accident may occur. Identifying an accident and to find the root causes for its
propagation is a highly complex task (Meshkati, 2006). Training is essential to make the
7

operators perform their jobs with proficiency and it helps to improve the plant production.
Training should be given over a period of time in regular intervals and the training should be
given in all scenarios the operator faces in real time (Bullemer, 1994). It’s been stated in
EEMUA No. 191 (EEMUA, 1999) that operators should be trained for detecting and diagnosing
faults in the alarm system.
ASM conducted a study in 6 chemical plants to understand abnormal situation
management (Bullemer, 1994). Information gathered from the plant incident reports to identify
the initiating cause of incidents showed that there were not effective training programs to build
the knowledge, skills and abilities of operations personnel. It was noted that the supervisors and
field operators were not able to provide significant guidance to console operators. The authors
stated that console operators expressed a need for more effective training and they also reported
a feedback from the companies who expressed a reluctance to identify people as the initiating
cause of an incident.
It is important to train and prepare the operators for infrequent events like leak detection
in liquid pipeline. In order to improve the probability of operators finding the problem, along
with on-the-job training, other methods should be designed and the safety study published by
NTSB on SCADA system noted the importance of such practices (Christie, 2006). The author
stated the mode of training the new hired operators have in the pipeline industries and also noted
that operators do not learn any specific details of the pipeline because of their current training
process.

2.4 Alarm Management
An alarm management challenge is to control nuisance alarms, alarm floods, alarms with wrong
priority, and redundant alarms. EEMUA 191 metrics are shown in Table 1 (EEMUA, 1999).
8

Table 1: Metric provided by EEMUA 191

Alarm Condition

Benchmark value

Average alarm rate in steady operation

< 1 per 10 minutes

Alarms in 10 minutes after plant upset

< 10

Average process alarm rate

120 per day

Peak alarm rate per hour

15

By integrating a knowledge- based system into the alarm management system, it is
possible to reduce nuisance alarms. This knowledge-base can be embedded into standard control
modules that process the alarms and it is possible to manage the way alarms are presented to
operators. For example, designers set alarms for low pressure, pump trip, and low flow rate for a
pump. If the operator shuts down one pump in emergency, the alarms associated with that pump
should be prevented from displaying on the screen. Ideally, alarms can be linked to a knowledge
base system that isolates the root cause of the alarms and suggests corrective actions. With this
approach there can be increase in the plant productivity and prevention of major accidents. The
above approach helps the operator to concentrate on action required alarms and they are not
distracted by all the information messages and nuisance alarms. This enables the operators to
understand alarms quickly and can take immediate action on the required alarms.
A questionnaire survey was conducted for the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) in 13
process plants which include oil refineries, chemical plants, and power stations (Bransby, 1997).
The above survey was conducted on 77 operators to determine the operators view on the alarm
system from their perspective. The final report published by the study stated above found that the
operators were not comfortable with alarm load and at times they received an excess of one

9

alarm per minute. There were cases when the operators were flooded by 100 alarms in first 10
minutes after plant upset. Study stated that the operators felt distracted by the alarm flood which
contains many nuisance alarms and so operators were used to give a minimum attention to these
little operational value alarms and silence them in order to investigate them after the plant was
stabilized. The authors noticed that in general, there were more problems with alarm systems in
the plants equipped with modern computer based distributed control systems than some of the
older plants which use individual alarm fascia. Some of the key observations made in this study
are listed below (Bransby, 1998)
•

It was noticed that only 6% of total alarms relate to active operational problems where
immediate action is required.

•

Around 50% of the alarms are repeated alarms, which were already acknowledged by the
operator in the last 5 minutes.

•

Most of the operators complained that the alarm flood was unmanageable during plant
upsets and sometimes they accept the alarms without even reading and understanding
them.
A survey conducted for the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) stated above described a

strategy followed by one oil refinery they have visited in order to improve alarm management.
The steps they have followed can be tried by other process industries to manage the alarm floods.
The refinery tried to analyze one month alarm log to find the top ten nuisance alarms, recurring
alarms which were noticed 500 times during that month and the standing alarms (Bransby,
1998). Based on the data, the company has tried to prioritize the alarms by having preliminary
review of alarms by groups of two operators who have given them a provisional priority. Of all
the prioritized alarms, operators reviewed the emergency alarms are re-categorized into lower
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priority. The above process continued till all the alarms were given the priority that was
determined fine for the plant production.
The U.S Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) conducted a study to understand the
human factor problems associated with power plant alarm systems (O'Hara, 1995). USNRC’s
main objective was to develop guidelines for advanced alarm systems. These guidelines were
developed considering the opinion of subject matter experts (SME’s) in power plant and human
factors engineering. The factors these SME’s gave high priority are alarm processing techniques
and alarm display issues. Alarm processing is required to filter the number of alarms and help the
operator to work on operational value alarms and alarm display helps to prioritize the most
significant alarms from low priority alarms. In this direction, O’Hara has illustrated the studies
that have been developed to understand the effect of alarm processing techniques and alarm
display strategies. For example, in a study to test the (Handling Alarms with Logic) alarm
system, inexperienced students were asked to find the problems in a water reactor. They were
trained with the system and the alarms were presented as unfiltered, filtered and filtered
messages with an overview display. Results indicated that the accuracy improved by filtering the
alarms. Similarly to test alarm display, a study was explained where alarm tile display, VDU
display, and combination of both the displays were tested.
A study was conducted to evaluate the usability of a Safety Information and Alarm Panel
(SIAP) on the operator performance in emergency situation (Norros, 2005). SIAP was designed
with the purpose of providing operators with safety- relevant information and guiding them in
decision making. The authors tested the impact of SIAP on process performance, crew working
practices. The SIAP study considered 4 accident scenarios (2 scenarios with SIAP and 2
scenarios without SIAP) and 6 crew members participated in the study. The emergency situations
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tested were leak in a steam line, power failure etc. The scenarios were developed by considering
the opinion of experts from the power plant. Results showed that there was no significant effect
of SIAP on process performance, but showed different effect on crew’s habit of action in
different scenarios. Crew’s habit of action was positive in some scenarios with SIAP and it was
negative in other scenarios. The authors attempted to test new methods of improving the control
rooms and similar tests can be done in other process industries and in this case pipeline industry.
Woods described the cognitive activities involved in dynamic fault management by
taking the results of field studies from domains like commercial aviation, process controls etc.
(Woods, 1995). Process status changes with time and fault management is the mechanism
through which these changes are monitored to see if there is any disturbance in the process
defined limits. Author explained directed attention, a cognitive function through which several
techniques for developing effective alarm systems was explained. Nuisance alarms, unspecified
alarm messages, alarm inflation and few others contribute to the difficulties that we find in alarm
systems fault management. Woods explained ‘Directed Attention’ and ‘Preattentive Reference’
considering the case studies from the process industry to explain the fault management. Directed
attention is a kind of coordination across process monitor agents where one agent can direct the
focus of other monitor agents to particular conditions, events in the monitor process. Preattentive
reference is also a cognitive process and it’s about how the characteristics of the alarm systems
are available to the controller in dynamic situations.

2.5 Operator Workload
An investigation at Scanraff oil refinery showed that during normal operation “the average
number of operator actions per hour was 3.1 (a random week) and in upset conditions, the
average number of actions per hour increased to 52.8” (Mattiasson, 1999). This means that the
12

operator has to take almost 1 action per minute during plant unstable situation. Apart from
alarms management, the operator has to convey the message over radio or telephone to the
ground operator. This mental workload will have impact on the quality of the operator
performance (Mattiasson, 1999). Information presented to the operator must be of a manageable
magnitude, otherwise the risk of mistakes increases.
The mental workload of operators working in the pipeline control room is highly variable
and according to Tikhomirov, high or unbalanced mental workload can have negative impact on
the operator’s performance. During an emergency situation, an operator may have a narrow span
of attention on each alarm and they may forget the proper sequence of actions to be taken to
solve a problem and it may result in them taking an incorrect evaluation of solutions, and effect
their decisions. A study to observe the importance of human factors funded by the ASM
Consortium showed that implementing human factors engineering into the design of an
operator’s graphical user interface (GUI) resulted in a 41% faster resolution of an abnormal
situation as compared to utilizing a traditional interface (Errington, 2005).
Process control systems (PCS) optimize the plant operations in a safe manner. Operators
depend entirely on PCS during normal plant condition and their workload is relatively low
(Mattiasson, 1999). During abnormal plant situation PCS generates many alarms and the
operator’s workload increases. Over a period of time situation crosses the operator’s limits to
restore the system functionality and the alarm system will be less helpful to the operator. It is
very important that the designers consider the operators workload during the interface design and
build the system. Operator interface should not add additional workload during an emergency
situation and should provide tools, recovery work procedures so that the operators have few
constraints to maintain. During emergency situation, flow and level indicators will be unreliable
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and show false values due to pressure and/or temperature drop in various process streams
(Mattiasson, 1999). Alarm system should monitor the process changes, because the alarm set
points will remain those configured for normal operation and it will be difficult to the operator to
analyze the alarm messages and take action.
In order to analyze operator’s performance in plant abnormal conditions, a Boiling Water
Reactor (BWR) nuclear plant in Japan used a full scale BWR plant simulator in their training
center and data was collected on operator’s responses to transients and accidents (Yoshimura,
1988). The authors have used on-line data collection systems and audio/video devices to gather
the operator’s data and data was used to analyze and identify the human errors and efforts were
made to examine the contributing factors of those errors. In nuclear power plants, operators have
heavy work load in feed water control systems, where they need to maintain the reactors cool
and it was observed during experiments that when the operators were given the scenario of
reactor scram, due to work load operators have done most of the errors. This example is to
emphasize that work load effect on human performance and decision making.

2.6 Operator Performance
The operator’s tasks change with changes in plant condition. If the plant is running without any
hiccups, the operator’s task is to optimize. When a minor upset occurs, the working conditions
change and now the operators task is to bring the plant process to normal operational state. If
there is a major upset, “the immediate task is to bring the plant to nearest safe state, and if
disaster threatens, shut it down, and try to limit the consequences (Mattiasson, 1999)”. To meet
these expectations the operator must be provided with the tools necessary to carry out her/his
duties to the best possible standard. There are many factors that can influence the operator
performance and during an emergency situation, these factors play a key role on the operator’s
14

decision. Some of the factors that need a close attention are human machine interface, operator
training, alarm systems, responsibilities and job design of the operator, environment, operator
fatigue, communication procedures and alarm presentation.
The alarms presented to the operator should be relevant to plant situation and it is
identified in today’s alarm systems that the quality of information presented is not efficient and
helpful to the extent the operator anticipated and having an impact on the operators performance.
(Mattiasson, 1999). All the alarms are predefined conditions in typical alarm systems. But the
process is dynamic and the operator has to adjust to the situation and deal with the process in
order to get best results (Mattiasson, 1999). It’s very important that an operator should identify
the high priority alarms from the alarm list which are constantly rearranged and operator finds it
difficult to search from the list which has changed, during emergency plant situations. Due to
shuffle in the alarm list, the operator cannot focus on a particular alarm; if the alarm suddenly
disappears from sight the operator must search to locate it. This search time consuming, and
would be better spent on process recovery (Mattiasson, 1999).
2.6.1 Differences in Alarm Response and Acknowledgement Times
A set of experiments were conducted by (Uhack, 2010) to find the operator response times with
different alarm rates. The response times were collected from 39 participants and using Tukey’s
mean test the difference was calculated. The author used both categorical and chronological
display with the alarm rates of (1, 2, 5, 10, 20) alarms per 10 minutes. The results showed that
for the 20 alarms per 10 minutes experiment there was a significant difference in participant
reaction time between all other experimental alarm rates used. The author also performed an
expanded Tukey’s Means test for the interaction between alarm rate and alarm display type and
results showed that, for the 20 alarms per 10 Min. experiment, there was a significant difference
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in participant reaction time between the categorical alarm window and chronological alarm
window. The mean response times (in seconds) observed for the 20 alarms per 10 minutes
experiment are as follows 112 (chronological alarm display) and 74 (categorical alarm display)
(Uhack, 2010).
The above experiments also revealed data related to participant acknowledgement time.
A Tukey’s means test was performed on participant acknowledgement time with alarms
displayed type and alarm rate. The results showed that, for the 20 alarms per 10 minutes
experiment, there was a significant difference in participant acknowledgement time for low
priority alarms between the categorical alarm window and chronological alarm window. The
mean acknowledgement times (in seconds) observed for the 20 alarms per 10 minutes
experiment, for low priority alarms only, are as follows: 191 (chronological alarm display) and
116 (categorical alarm display) (Uhack, 2010).

2.7 Standards and Regulations
2.7.1 CFR Part 192
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) have made some changes
with the federal pipeline safety regulations and according to new regulations in CFR part 192
(CFR, 2010); the pipeline industry management must develop control room management
procedures by August 1, 2011 and implement those procedures by February 1, 2012. Some of
these control room management procedures included are, to define rules and responsibilities of
operators and the operators must be given proper training, necessary information and the
management should design the methods to mitigate the operator’s fatigue. Each operator is given
on-the-job training and the management reviews the performance of these operators over a time
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and will periodically assess the operator’s skills and knowledge through operator qualification
(OQ) process (Nimmo, 2010).
2.7.2 ISO 11064
The ISO 11064 standard (http://www.iso.org/iso/home.html) guides the ergonomic design of
control rooms and is divided into 7 parts. The standard states the principles in designing the
control rooms and the principles for the arrangement of control suites. ISO11064-1:2000 deals
with the principles for the design of control rooms. ISO11064-2:2000 provides principles of
control suite arrangement. ISO11064-3:1999 provides guidance on control room layout issues.
ISO11064-4:2004 provides guidance on workstation layout and dimensions. ISO11064-5:2008
provides guidance on displays and controls. ISO11064-6:2005 provides guidance on
environmental requirements and ISO11064-7:2006 provides principles for the evaluation of
control centers.
2.7.3 EEMUA 191
The EEMUA 191 standard (EEMUA, 1999) was first published in 1999 and has become the
globally accepted and leading guide to good practice for alarm management. It gives
comprehensive guidance on designing, managing and procuring an effective alarm system.
Following the guidance in EEMUA 191 should result in better alarm systems that are more
usable and that result in safer and more cost-efficient industrial operations. EEMUA 191 covers
the aspects of alarm system life cycle and above standards deal with environment and human
computer interaction issues.
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2.8 Summary
The life cycle of alarm management plays a vital role in designing the safe and efficient SCADA
system. Human errors cannot be eliminated, but can be reduced with good strategies
implemented by the pipeline industries. By providing training, guidance and encouraging the
operators can lead to improvement in their performance. By designing the control rooms around
the operators requirements can reduce the physical and mental workload. By integrating the
safety system and automation system as suggested by (Nimmo, 2010), designers can reduce the
workspace the operator has to concentrate and with advanced technology, now it’s possible to
incorporate knowledge base into alarm systems so they can guide the operator to take corrective
actions. Safety should be of high priority when the operator cannot control the situation and
should shut down the plant if necessary. Previous experiments done by (Uhack, 2010) show that
the operator reaction times increase with increase in alarm rates and it’s been observed in his
results that the operators tend to concentrate more on high priority alarms during emergencies.
Standards like ISO 11064, EEMUA 191guide the designers and the operators in achieving what
they intend to do.
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CHAPTER 3: EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
To evaluate the impact of different alarm rates and interfaces on operator performance, a withinsubject repeated-measurement design was used to assess different alarm rates (15 per 10 minutes,
20 per 10 minutes) and different alarm display interfaces (chronological and categorical). A
liquid pipeline simulation experiment of 1 hour was developed and the operators ran the
experiment repeatedly at different levels: alarm rate (15, 20, and 25) alarms per 10 minute
scenarios in chronological display and alarm rate (20, 25, and 30) alarms per 10 minute scenarios
in categorical display

3.1 Experimental Apparatus
Advantica’s Stoner Pipeline Simulator (SPS) is widely used in the pipeline community for
engineering analysis and SPS was used to develop a pipeline model which calculates the fluid
hydraulics and transients occurring in the simulated pipeline. Iconics Genesis-32 is an
automation suite for developing OPC (Object Linking and Embedded (OLE) for Process
Control) enabled Human Machine Interfaces for SCADA applications. For this project,
GraphWorx32 and AlarmWorX32 was be used from the suite. GraphWorx32 is an HMI
graphical display interface design package that was used to develop the graphical user interface
(GUI) for the pipeline model. AlarmWorX32 is an alarm management system package used for
handling alarm displays and it supports a backend database (Microsoft Access) to store the log
data of all the changes happening in the simulation related to alarms.
Interface prototype screens were developed to be similar to the SCADA screens used for
typical pipeline operations, and were shown to industry technical members to assess the face
validity of the simulation during the design of experiment; the prototypes were approved by the
industry technical members. The alarm rates and the complexity of the experiment were
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discussed with industry technical members prior to design. After the design of the experimental
apparatus is completed, a pilot study has been conducted to evaluate the apparatus and
experimental setup.
The experiment simulation consists of 2 pipelines (carrying diesel, gasoline, and crude
oil), one from a rig and the other from a refinery. Each line has 10 stations as shown in (Figure
2). There is a detailed display for each station as shown in (Figure 3) and the operator can open
all the stations simultaneously. In each station the operator can check the volume of the fluid and
pressure maintained at each pump, and can use a block valve to maintain the steady flow of the
liquid. The operator can start or stop pumps by right clicking the mouse button, and a window
pops up to perform the operation. Each pump has suction and discharge valves, and a bypass
valve. There are two tank farms, one at each end of the pipeline as shown in (Figure 2); their
display is shown in (Figure 5) and (Figure 6). The inflow to the pipeline is circulated through a
dehydrator (Figure 4) to remove water within the product in the pipeline. Each station has the
hydraulic variation graph to show the pressure, standard flow and elevation.

Figure 2: Overview of pipeline stations

Two kinds of alarm displays were used to analyze the operator performance. The alarms
were displayed either in categorical (Figure 7) or chronological (Figure 8) view based on the
experimental condition. In the chronological display, the alarms are arranged in order of time of
occurrence. For the categorical display alarms are grouped based on their priority and sorted by
time of occurrence within each category. In this experiment alarms were be distributed based on
the EEMUA 191 priority distribution. According to the EEMUA 191 standard (EEMUA, 1999),
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the priority distribution of alarms are 80% Low – 15% Medium – 5% High. All the alarms are
predefined and there are no added nuisance alarms or distractions.

Figure 3: Detailed view of pipeline station

Figure 4: Dehydrator

The operator has to take action for each alarm to stabilize the flow and control the
situation. In the alarm display interface, the operators are provided with alarm messages, and
they need to double click the alarm message to acknowledge the alarm. The high priority alarms
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are displayed in red, medium priority in yellow and low priority in white. The design of the
experiment was such that the workload at different intervals of time will be consistent. Alarm
arrival time was randomized by type and priority. Different batches of diesel, gasoline, and crude
oil were used in this experiment.

Figure 5: Upstream display of fluid

Figure 6: Downstream display of fluid
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Figure 7: Categorical display

Figure 8: Chronological display

3.2 Experimental Design
The experiment was designed to collect the data and measure the performance of pipeline and
refinery control room operators, who are responsible to monitor the transport of different petroleum
products through the pipelines similar to what we find in this simulation. The independent variables
taken for this study are:
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•

Alarm Rates:
Table 2: Alarm rates in different display types
Chronological
display

Categorical display

15 per 10 minutes
20 per 10 minutes

20 per 10 minutes

25 per 10 minutes

25 per 10 minutes

30 per 10 minutes

•

Alarm Windows – Categorical, Chronological. In the analysis categorical display was
designated as 1 and chronological display as 2.

The dependent variables are:
•

Response Time – Time elapsed after an alarm is raised until the action procedure
completed by the operator. Some alarms require multiple actions to complete.

•

Acknowledge Time – Time operator takes to acknowledge the alarm after it gets
displayed in the alarm window. The alarm message can be acknowledged by double
clicking the message displayed in the alarm window and also the alarm window has three
buttons (Ack-selected button, Ack-displayed button and Ack-filtered) which the operator
can use to acknowledge the alarm message.

•

Accuracy of response – This variable was used to analyze whether the operator took
appropriate action to complete the task. The operator’s work was observed while running
the experiment and was be given score of ‘0’ for unsuccessful completion and ‘1’ for
successful completion for each alarm.
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Every effort was made to have the same work load (navigation, complexity of alarm
actions, number of steps to complete the task etc.,) in all the experiments. Some of the abnormal
events the operator has to handle are leak events, power failures, equipment malfunctions, and
equipment failures. A list of different alarms used in the experiments are shown in (Figure 9)
50
H.HLM
40

BINB

30

BOUT

20

LAP

10

AP

0
15

20

25

30

PSP

List of alarms shown in the figure above
PSP – Pump suction pressure related alarms
PBP – Pump bypass pressure related alarms
PDP – Pump discharge pressure related alarms
AP – Pump power trip alarms
LAP – Leak at pump alarms
BOUT, BINB – Block valve outlet and inlet related alarms
H. HLM – Temperature rise in device alarms.

Figure 9 : Alarms distribution in different alarm rates

3.3 Experiment Approach
A total of 25 control room operators ran the experiment and each participant was trained in an
effort to orient them to the type of situations they would experience during supervision and
management of the simulated pipeline system. Each participant was expected to spend a
maximum of 7 to 8 hours (training + six 1-hour experiments + breaks) to run all the experimental
conditions and the operator’s performances was measured in the form of response time, accuracy
of response and acknowledge time. It took more than 250 hours to run the experiments and
organize the data collected from experiments. All the participants were trained in order to
familiarize them with the system. The operators were asked to complete a demographic survey in
order to collect gender, age and experience details. All participants went through a training
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presentation (see Appendix-5), and were given demonstration of simulation. This training
allowed the participants to understand the tasks they needed to complete while running the
experiment. Data was collected from every participant and a decision was made during analysis
whether to exclude or include participant data if there were anomalies in the analysis
(homogeneity of variance was disturbed) by including the data.

3.4 Experimental Procedure
The experiments were conducted at operator control centers of well-known petro-chemical
companies. Companies provided a schedule as to when the operators were available to run the
experiments, and the companies were visited according to the schedule. Each operator completed
6 scenarios in the experiment. The scenario orders were randomized as shown in Appendix-1.
The operator was given a 5-10 minute break between the scenarios. Training and all scenarios
were completed in one day for each operator. Each operator ran (20, 25 and 30) alarms per 10
minutes scenarios in categorical and (15, 20 and 25) alarms per 10 minutes in chronological
display. Operators were asked to stop the experiment after exactly 1 hour even if they had alarms
still to be handled in the queue. The operator’s acknowledge time and response time were
automatically stored into the database. Operator operations were recorded using Morae (onscreen
video capture software). The recorded video was used as a backup to manually process and
extract the response and acknowledge times if there are any anomalies in the data collected
through automation.
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CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
The standard analysis of variance (ANOVA) method was used to test the differences in the
operator’s performance for each experiment by analyzing the performance measures (e.g.,
acknowledge time and the response time) which were collected from the experiment. This
project is an extension of the work conducted by Uhack and Harvey on the alarm rates and alarm
displays (Uhack, 2010). Uhack have tested 1, 2, 5, 10, 20 alarm rates and results observed a
significant difference between 10 and 20 alarm rates. In this project an alarm rate between 10
and 20 was taken and tested. Uhack results showed that categorical alarm display was better than
chronological display. Here a similar approach was followed and instead of short experiments
the data was collected for 1-hour to test the alarm rates 20 and 25 in both the alarm displays and
analyze the data. With an increase of 5 alarms, 4 different alarm rates were designed and tested
to see the threshold point where an operator’s performance drops.

4.1 Model Assumptions
Twenty five operators participated in this project and during analysis 2 operator’s data was
excluded. Those two operator’s data was excluded because they have taken a lot of time to
understand the simulation and had many doubts on the working procedure of the experiments.
Those two operators were assisted during the experiments and so their response times were
excluded. So for this study 23 operator’s data was considered. Prior to using ANOVA, the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov-Lilliefors (KSL) Normality test was conducted on the reaction time
dependent measure to examine the goodness of fit. Results showed that the goodness of fit null
hypothesis was rejected (p<0.05), meaning that the data was not normally distributed. Levine’s
homogeneity of variance test was used to assess the homogeneity of variance. The resulting pvalue of Levene’s test was less than 0.05 and so it was concluded that there was significant
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difference of variance in the sample data. Given the failed normality test and homogeneity of
variance test, SAS 9.2 PROC MIXED was used to assess the data. Proc Mixed is robust to
normality and homogeneity of variance as long as the covariance matrix is acceptable (see
http://www.uky.edu/ComputingCenter/SSTARS/www/documentation/mixed1.htm description).
PROC Mixed was run and the covariance matrix was acceptable and thus the model was
evaluated using PROC Mixed by the ANOVA and Tukey’s mean test. In order to better compare
the results an independent variable Display_AlarmRate combining the alarm rate and alarm
display type was used in the analysis. By combining the alarm rate and alarm display into a
single variable, the results can be analyzed comparing all the six experiments, instead of having
the results divided on alarm display. The hypotheses tested are discussed below.
4.1.1 Hypothesis 1
Null Hypothesis 1: No differences exist in participant accuracy of response with different alarm
rates.
Alternative Hypothesis 1: Differences exist in participant accuracy of response.
Dependent Variable:

Accuracy of Response (see 3.2 Experimental Design).

Independent Variables:

Alarm Rates.

The significance of accuracy of response between different alarm rates was tested using ANOVA
using a significance level of 0.05 and to determine the difference with different alarm rates a
Tukey’s mean test was conducted.
Levene’s test was used to assess the equality of variances in different sample data and it
assumes that variances of the population (alarm rate) from which different sample data taken are
equal. For this hypothesis, Levene’s test (See Appendix-6:Table 3) was used to assess the
homogeneity of variance of accuracy of response and the resulting p-value was greater than 0.05
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and so we cannot conclude that there is a difference between the variances in the data (alarm
rates). ANOVA test results showed that there was no significant effect of alarm rates on accuracy
of response (see Appendix-6: Table 4)
The required actions to complete a task (respond to alarm) are predefined and the
operators were also trained as what action was expected when a particular alarm condition rises.
For example, if suction valve and discharge valve of a pump are opened and an alarm is
displayed showing that the bypass valve is malfunctioned, the appropriate action is to close the
bypass valve. In the above case if the operators accidently or intentionally opened the bypass, it
is considered as a mistake and accuracy of response variable defined is set to ‘0’ for that alarm.
The hydraulics used in the simulation helps the operator to monitor the status of the pipeline and
if a wrong action was taken for an alarm, they can immediately find the change in hydraulics and
recheck the stations where there is a change and rectify the problem. So in this study, the first
action the operator took to an alarm was considered as accuracy of response. Even though the
operators were asked to stop the experiments exactly after 1 hour, they didn’t feel time pressure
and took their time to respond to the alarms. Every operator spent time to understand the alarm
message and their response time increased with increase in alarm rate.
4.1.2 Hypothesis 2
Null Hypothesis 2: No differences exist in participant response times with alarms
displayed in categorical and chronological display.
Alternative Hypothesis 2: There will be increase in participant response times with alarms
displayed in chronological than categorical display.
Dependent Variable:

Response Time (see 3.2 Experimental Design).

Independent Variable:

Alarm display with given alarm rate.
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Significance of alarm display was tested using ANOVA and to test the effect of different alarm
rates in alarm displays, a Tukey’s mean test was tested.

Figure 10: Response time by Alarm Display for 20 and 25 Alarm Rate

Levene’s test was used to assess the homogeneity of variance and (see Appendix-7: Table
5) shows that p-value was less than 0.05 and so we can conclude that there was a difference
between the variances in the population (for this hypothesis, the population is divided based on
alarm rate and alarm window).
The independent variable Display_AlarmRate was used to combine the alarm rate variable
and alarm display variable in order to compare all the six experiments tested on the operators.
Operators did (20, 25) alarm rates per 10 minute experiments in both the categorical and
chronological display and only those two alarm rates data was considered for testing the
significance of alarm display. (Appendix-7: Table 6) shows that there is significant difference
when the alarm rates were tested using categorical or chronological display on alarm rates. Both
the alarm rates were tested to check the alarm priority significance in both the alarm displays.
Average response time for each priority (Low, Medium, and High) was shown in (Figure 10).
The average response times are better in categorical display, but statistical analysis didn’t show
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any significant difference and all the priorities response times were similar.
Tukey’s mean test (see Appendix-7: Table 7) shows that (30, 15) alarm rates are
significantly different from other alarm rates. Alarm rates 20 and 25 did show a slight difference.
4.1.3 Hypothesis 3
Null Hypothesis 3: Operator response time will not change with different alarm rates.
Alternative Hypothesis 3: Operator response time will change with increased alarm rates.
Dependent Variable:

Response Time

Independent Variable:

Alarm Rate

The differences in response times with different alarm rates are tested using ANOVA and to
determine the difference with different alarm rates, tukey’s mean test will be conducted.

Figure 11 : Response time by alarm rate

Results show (see Figure 11) a steady increase in the response times from 15 per 10
minutes to 25 per 10 minutes and a significant difference between the 25 and 30 alarms per 10
minute response time. Both 20 alarms per 10 minutes and 25 alarms per 10 minutes alarm rates

31

are tested using both alarm displays and there is only a slight difference in the response time
between the two interfaces.

Figure 12 : Response time based on alarm type

As the alarm rate increased (see Figure 12), the operators spent less time in reacting to
high priority alarms and took more time to handle low priority alarms. It shows that the operators
are well aware of the alarms they need to handle first. In the process they took more time to react
on low priority alarms, and chances are that they may turn into high priority alarms over the
period of time in abnormal situation. Operators are trained to act on high priority alarms first and
in abnormal situation with a number of alarms to respond, the operator’s doesn’t have control
over the low priority alarms and the time operator has to make a decision is limited. Most of the
low priority alarms are information alarms and it’s difficult to choose the one from many to act
first. Measures need to be taken to help operators respond to these low priority alarms without
much trouble.
Levene’s test (see Appendix-8: Table 8) shows that the resulting p-value was less than
0.05 and so it can be assumed that there is a difference between the variance in the different
alarm rate responses.
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ANOVA test (see Appendix-8: Table 9) was done to observe the significance of alarm
rate on operator’s response time and the results concluded that differences do exist in operator’s
response time for increased alarm rate.
A Tukey’s mean test was conducted to see which alarm rates were different, and results
are given in (Appendix-8: Table 10). Results clearly show that 30 per 10 minute alarm rate was
significantly different than other alarm rates (alarm rates not connected by same letters are
significantly different).

4.2 Observations
4.2.1 Acknowledge Time
Apart from response time and accuracy of response, acknowledge time was calculated from the
operator’s data. Though the acknowledge time doesn’t have a direct impact on the operators
performance, the results show a pattern in the operator’s reaction when the alarms were
displayed in different alarm displays. It was not specified during training the required routine to
acknowledge the alarms, because the concentration was more on response time and accuracy of
response and each operator had different approach to acknowledge the alarms. A few operators
acknowledged the alarm and then took the action and a few others acknowledged the alarm after
taking the action. In the second case, the recorded acknowledge time is more than the response
time. Some operators have acknowledged 10, 15 alarms at once. Even when the operators were
not instructed to follow a particular sequence, their acknowledge time was different when alarms
were displayed using categorical and chronological displays. Acknowledge time was
significantly different in both the displays and the results showed that the operators took less
time to acknowledge the alarms when used categorical display. Average time to acknowledge per
alarm display per alarm rate and alarm priority is given in Figure 13.
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Operators tend to respond quickly when alarms were displayed in categorical display and
it is clearly shown when acknowledge time for 20, 25 alarm rates was compared. Alarm displays
were designed such that the alarm color is faded out when the alarms are acknowledged and the
operators will not be able to identify the alarm priority once they acknowledge. Here the
categorical display helps by having separate blocks for different priority and the operators can
easily choose the alarms they want to work depending on their priority and this might be the
reasons for better acknowledge time in categorical display. Tukey’s mean test was conducted to
compare the alarm rates and results are shown in (Appendix-9: Table 11).

Figure 13 : Acknowledge time

4.2.2 Response Time Considering Operators Age
Two interesting points were observed when the participant response time was calculated
considering the operator’s age as a factor. Operator’s above 40 years were taken as one group
and operators below 40 as the other group and their response times were compared. In this
analysis, operators experience was not considered. There is no direct relation between age and
experience. Few operators above 40 years have less experience than operators below 40 years.
Out of 23 operators (see Appendix-3 for age), 12 operators were below 40 years and their
average age is 32 years and remaining 11 operators aged more than 40 years and their average
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age is 51 years. Every operator was given the same amount of training and they didn’t start the
experiments until they felt comfortable with the simulation.
It was observed while conducting the experiments that the operators above 40 years took
more time to get used to the simulation. In Figure 14, effort was made to compare the results of
both the age group operators and it can be observed that the response time of operators above 40
years is more than the other group. Results showed that the operators below 40 years were
productive using categorical display and the operators aged above 40 years have better response
time using chronological display (see Appendix-9:Table 12 and Appendix-9:Table 13 for
ANOVA test and tukey’s mean test results). To analyze the response times for each alarm rate
for both the age groups, an independent variable DisplayRate_Age was used to combine the
alarm display, alarm rate and age. Age = 1 for Operators below 40 years and age = 2 for
operators above 40 years. Response time for 30 per 10 minute alarm rate is 21 sec for operators
aged below 40 and is 31 sec for the other group. It means that the break point for both the age
groups operators is not the same and it shows that age does play a role in response time.
4.2.3 Subject Usability Questionnaire Results
After the completion of the experiments operators were given questionnaire to know how they
felt about the simulation and the experiments. All the operators liked the way alarms were
displayed using different alarm windows and they were able to feel the difference in their
reaction time in two alarm displays. Chart with results of all the questions answered by the
operators is given in Appendix-4. Feedback was taken from each operator about their preferred
alarm display window. Most of the operator’s preferred using the categorical display (see Figure
15) of alarms and felt that they can be more productive by using grouping of alarms by priority.
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Figure 14: Response time of operators divided into two age groups

4.3 Future Research
In this project emphasis was laid on the operator’s performance for given alarm rates. The tasks
defined for each response were simple and so operator’s accuracy of response was not tested
precisely. This project must be considered from human factors point of view as the tests were
designed to calculate the response time with only a handful number of tasks.
In real world, operators have to look into so many variables in order to make a decision
and they communicate with ground operators to check the status of the situation.
•

This project can be extended by increasing the complexity of the simulation which suits
the real world operator operations.

•

All the 25 operators tested were male and so future research can be done comparing the
response of female operators with male operators.
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•

All the 25 operators did the experiments during morning shift (from 6AM to 6PM). So
tests can be conducted to find the response during night shift.

•

In this project, three alarm priorities were used and future experiments can be conducted
by further dividing the priorities in a way to categorize the alarms based on the action the
operators have to take.

•

Experiments can be designed to test the fatigue and time pressure effect on the operator’s
accuracy of response.

•

Operators can be tested by varying the shift length and analyze their response time over a
period of time. Tests can be done to see the response time of operators during a shift
change (example: morning shift to night shift).

Figure 15 : Operator preference

4.4 Conclusion
Alarm management has become a major issue in modern process plants and it’s been recognized
as an area of weakness. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has recommended
improvement in alarm management, training and human machine interface design. The design
issues in alarm management include displaying the detailed information of where the problem is,
and providing suggestive information to the operator in rectifying the problem. This study
focused on alarm display and the interface design aspects. Results show that the performance of
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the operator in terms of response time is affected by an increased alarm rate and performance
was dramatically different between the 25 and 30 alarms 10 minute alarm rate. Operator’s
response time linearly increased with change from 15 to 25 alarm rate. Between 25 and 30 alarm
rates there was a difference of 4 seconds. It was observed that the operators felt it difficult to
navigate to different interface screens, and at times because of the alarm flood they couldn’t
concentrate on the alarm message. Four seconds may not look significant, but considering the
complexity of the simulation and the tasks defined, if we compare the results to the real world
scenario, the operators have additional workload and need to maintain communication with
ground operators. The 30 alarm rate can be considered as breakpoint (alarm rate at which the
operators alarm response may be inaccurate and where the operators might feel the pressure to
take decisions) from this project. In future, experiments can be designed to analyze if there is a
linear increase in operator response time between 25 and 30 alarm rates to confirm the
breakpoint precisely. It should be noticed that the alarm rates tested in this project are higher than
EEMUA 191 standards. Even though the results did not show a significant difference in the
alarm displays, operators felt more productive using the categorical display and their opinion
should be considered and implemented in the pipeline industry. In an emergency situation, faced
with an alarm flood, operators may have little time to respond to the situation; under higher
alarm rates, operators may not take timely action or may be forced to shortcut analysis, thereby
increasing the probability of a wrong decision. This project is just a beginning step to understand
the importance of alarm management and operators in the petro-chemical industry.
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APPENDIX 1: TABLE SHOWING ORDER OF EXPERIMENTS
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

6
2
5
1
4
2
4
3
1
6
3
1
5
1
2
4
3
2
6
5
6
3
4
5
1
2
4
3
5
6

3
3
4
4
3
3
1
1
6
4
6
2
1
6
4
6
5
3
5
1
5
5
5
4
5
3
2
4
3
4

4
1
3
6
2
6
3
4
3
5
5
3
2
2
5
3
6
4
2
3
1
4
2
1
4
1
6
1
1
5

(1) - 15 in 10 minutes (Chronological)
(2) - 20 in 10 minutes (Chronological)
(3) - 25 in 10 minutes (Chronological)
(4) - 20 in 10 minutes (Category)
(5) - 25 in 10 minutes (Category)
(6) - 30 in 10 minutes (Category)
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1
5
2
3
6
1
6
2
2
3
2
6
3
4
6
1
2
5
3
4
4
2
1
6
3
6
5
6
6
2

2
4
1
2
5
4
2
5
4
2
4
5
6
5
1
5
1
1
4
6
3
1
6
2
6
5
1
5
2

3

5
6
6
5
1
5
5
6
5
1
1
4
4
3
3
2
4
6
1
2
2
6
3
3
2
4
3
2
4
1

APPENDIX 2: CONSENT FORM
Title:
Determine the performance of control room operators in alarm management.
Work Site:
The experiments will be conducted at different sites to study site effects as well as different
types of operator effects (e.g., pipeline vs. refinery)
Contacts:
1.

Craig M. Harvey, Ph.D., P.E.
Interim Chair, Associate Professor
Dept. of Construction Mgt & Industrial Eng
3128 Patrick F. Taylor Hal
Louisiana State University
Baton Rouge, LA 70803
Ph: 225-578-8761 (M-F 9am-4pm)
Email: harvey@lsu.edu

2.

Dileep Buddaraju
Masters in Engineering Science (student)
Louisiana State University
Ph. 646-306-8612 (M-F 9am-4pm)

Purpose of the Study:
Specific objectives will be addresses in this research:
1. Evaluate different attributes and their interactions with respect to alarms on operator
performance to include:
a. Alarm rate. Alarm floods will be varied at an average specific rate (e.g., 10/minute) over
a given simulation. These floods will be randomly distributed throughout the simulation
so as to be more representative of the real world. All participants will receive the same
random distribution of alarms.
b. Alarm priority categories (e.g., critical, informational). Three different alarm types (e.g.,
high, medium, low) will be used. In this study, the data collected is used to analyze the
operator performance in different categories of alarms.
c. Alarm presentation method. Different means of presenting the alarms will be evaluated
including grouping by priority, color-coding, and schematic presentation only. Methods
will be drawn from literature review and industry input.
2. Develop guidelines based on the research for use by the petroleum industry in designing alarm
systems including rate, priority categories, and display mode.
3. Submit additional proposed work to the Center for Operator Performance as a result of the
findings from this research.
4. Performance data will be captured as a function of time (acknowledgment time, response time,
accuracy of response, successful completion, alarm queue length, average time in queue). All
alarms will execute within the one hour run time; however, the simulation will run until all
alarms have been resolved by the controllers/operators.
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5. COP will provide Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) to assist in designing the simulation conditions
and for evaluating the simulation after it is built. This will ensure a higher fidelity simulation to
use for real operators.
6. LSU will conduct a small (e.g., 5-10 students) pilot study of students prior taking the experiment
to the field. This will be used to assess the experimental procedures.
Number of Subjects:
Thirty subjects are expected to participate in this experiment.
Study Procedures:
Experiments will be conducted using the Stoner Pipeline Simulation software available in LSU’s
safety laboratory. Pipeline operators will serve as human subjects with the hope to eventually recruit
controllers from local petroleum companies and Center for Operator Performance’s member companies
after some initial work. Participants will only be included in an experiment upon successfully performing
a qualifying assessment. To conduct this assessment, scaled down version of the actual experiment will
be used to qualify participants to participant in the experiment. This method of qualification was used in
previous research conducted in LSU’s.
To evaluate the different alarm rates, data collected from the experiments is analyzed and
computer interaction capture tool, Morae™, will be used if there are any anomalies in the data collected
through alarm automation. Morae will allow researchers to capture operator actions for operator
performance analysis and to assess operator performance in time critical scenarios based on response
time, missed alarms, errors, etc. (Rothrock, Harvey, Burns, 2005).
Benefits:
Benefits which can be realized from this research are the contribution of empirical research data
and performance & alarm presentation guidelines for SCADA system operators. Currently, there are
many voids in the scientific community regarding controlled studies in this area.
Risks/Discomforts:
There are no known major risks involved while subjects are operating a computer. The operator
needs to spend 7-8 hours of time. So they might feel tired, but that’s one of the areas of interest for this
research.
Right to Refuse:
It is stated that participation in the study is voluntary and that subjects may change their mind
and withdraw from the study at any time without penalty or loss of any benefit to which they may
otherwise be entitled.
Privacy:
This is an anonymous study.
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Signatures:
'The study has been discussed with me and all my questions have been answered. I may direct additional
questions regarding study specifics to the investigators. If I have questions about subjects' rights or other
concerns, I can contact Robert C. Mathews, Chairman, LSU Institutional Review Board, (225)578-8692,
irb@lsu.edu, and www.lsu.edu/irb. I agree to participate in the study described above and acknowledge
the researchers' obligation to provide me with a copy of this consent form if signed by me.'
Subject Signature:____________________________ Date:_________________
Illiterate subjects (When ANY subjects are likely to be illiterate, the "reader statement" and signature line
below are included.)
'The study subject has indicated to me that he/she is unable to read. I certify that I have read this consent
form to the subject and explained that by completing the signature line above, the subject has agreed to
participate.'
Signature of Reader:_____________________________ Date:_______________
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APPENDIX 3: PARTICIPANTS AGE COLLECTED FROM
DEMOGRAPHIC SURVEY

Participants below age 40

Participants above age 40

Participant
Number

Age

Participant
Number

Age

1

28

3

57

2

27

8

54

5

35

9

53

6

30

10

45

7

36

13

48

11

35

15

53

12

36

16

42

14

30

17

64

19

26

18

44

20

27

23

51

21

39

25

50

22

37

Average Age

51

Average Age

32.16667

Operators aged below 40 years

Alarm Rate

Categorical

15

Operators aged above 40 years

Chronological

Alarm Rate

17.65245599

15

Categorical

Chronological
20.32995953

20

18.54412786

21.12517385

20

22.39545455

20.15075759

25

18.78642936

19.11735262

25

25.22363406

24.69413688

30

20.6324074

30

30.90775681
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APPENDIX 4: SUBJECT USABILITY QUESTIONNAIRE
For each of the statements below, circle the rating of your choice.

1. Overall, I am satisfied with the ease of completing tasks using this system.
STRONGLY
AGREE

STRONGLY
1☐
☐

2☐
☐

3☐
☐

4☐
☐

5☐
☐

DISAGREE

COMMENTS:

2. Overall, I am satisfied with the support information (messages, documentation) when completing tasks
using this system.
STRONGLY
AGREE

STRONGLY
1☐
☐

2☐
☐

3☐
☐

4☐
☐

5☐
☐

DISAGREE

COMMENTS:

3. Overall, I am satisfied with how easy it is to use this system.
STRONGLY
AGREE

STRONGLY
1☐
☐

2☐
☐

3☐
☐

4☐
☐

5☐
☐

DISAGREE

COMMENTS:

4. It was simple to use this system.
STRONGLY
AGREE

STRONGLY
1☐
☐

2☐
☐

3☐
☐

4☐
☐

5☐
☐

COMMENTS:

5. I could effectively complete the tasks and scenarios using this system.
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DISAGREE

STRONGLY
AGREE

STRONGLY
1☐
☐

2☐
☐

3☐
☐

4☐
☐

5☐
☐

DISAGREE

COMMENTS:
6. I was able to efficiently complete the tasks and scenarios using this system.
STRONGLY
AGREE

STRONGLY
1☐
☐

2☐
☐

3☐
☐

4☐
☐

5☐
☐

DISAGREE

COMMENTS:
7. I felt comfortable using this system.

STRONGLY
AGREE

STRONGLY
1☐
☐

2☐
☐

3☐
☐

4☐
☐

5☐
☐

DISAGREE

COMMENTS:
8. It was easy to learn how to use this system.
STRONGLY
AGREE

STRONGLY
1☐
☐

2☐
☐

3☐
☐

4☐
☐

5☐
☐

DISAGREE

COMMENTS:
9. I believe I could become productive quickly using this system.
STRONGLY
AGREE

STRONGLY
1☐
☐

2☐
☐

3☐
☐

4☐
☐

5☐
☐

DISAGREE

COMMENTS:
10. The information (on-screen messages and other documentation) provided with this system was clear.
STRONGLY
AGREE

STRONGLY
1☐
☐

2☐
☐

3☐
☐

4☐
☐

5☐
☐

DISAGREE

COMMENTS:
11. It was easy to find the information I needed to complete tasks.
STRONGLY

STRONGLY
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AGREE

1☐
☐

2☐
☐

3☐
☐

4☐
☐

5☐
☐

DISAGREE

COMMENTS:
12. The information provided for the system was easy to understand.
STRONGLY
AGREE

STRONGLY
1☐
☐

2☐
☐

3☐
☐

4☐
☐

5☐
☐

DISAGREE

COMMENTS:
13. The information was effective in helping me complete the tasks and scenarios.
STRONGLY
AGREE

STRONGLY
1☐
☐

2☐
☐

3☐
☐

4☐
☐

5☐
☐

DISAGREE

COMMENTS:
14. The organization of information on the system screens was clear.
STRONGLY
AGREE

STRONGLY
1☐
☐

2☐
☐

3☐
☐

4☐
☐

5☐
☐

DISAGREE

COMMENTS:
15. I liked using the interface of this system.
STRONGLY
AGREE

STRONGLY
1☐
☐

2☐
☐

3☐
☐

4☐
☐

5☐
☐

DISAGREE

COMMENTS:
16. This system has all the functions and capabilities I expect it to have.
STRONGLY
AGREE

STRONGLY
1☐
☐

2☐
☐

3☐
☐

4☐
☐

5☐
☐

DISAGREE

COMMENTS:
17. Overall, I am satisfied with this system.
STRONGLY
AGREE

STRONGLY
1☐
☐

2☐
☐

3☐
☐

4☐
☐

COMMENTS:
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5☐
☐

DISAGREE

18. Which alarm window did you prefer using and why?
☐Categorical
☐Chronological
COMMENTS:

Figure 16 : Operators questionnaire results
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APPENDIX 5: OPERATORS TRAINING MANUAL
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51

52

53

54

55

56
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APPENDIX 6: HYPOTHESIS 1 ANALYSIS
Table 3: Levene's test to assess the accuracy of response variance

Table 4: ANOVA test to determine the significance of alarm rate on accuracy of response
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APPENDIX 7: HYPOTHESIS 2 ANALYSIS

Table 5: Levene's test to assess the alarm display variance

Table 6: ANOVA test to determine the significance of response time on alarm display

Table 7: Tukey's mean test comparing alarm rates in different alarm display

Categorical display = 1, Chronological display = 2. In the above tukey’s test, convention used for
different levels shown is (Alarmdisplay_Alarmrate taken as Display-Rate in Anova test). For
example 1_20 means alarm rate 20 displayed in categorical alarm window.
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APPENDIX 8: HYPOTHESIS 3 ANALYSIS
Table 8: Levene's test to assess alarm rate variance

Table 9: ANOVA test to determine the significance of alarm rate

Table 10: Tukey's mean test on alarm rate
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APPENDIX 9: ACKNOWLEDGEMENT TIME AND AGE GROUP
RESPONSE TIME ANALYSIS
Table 11: Tukey's mean test to compare different levels of acknowledge time with alarm rate

Table 12: ANOVA test to determine the significance of age on response time

Table 13: Tukey's mean test on response time based on age group and alarm rate

Categorical display = 1, Chronological display = 2. Age = 1 for operators age below 40 years and
age = 2 for operators above 40 years of age. In the above tukey’s test, convention used for
different levels shown is (Alarmdisplay_Alarmrate_Age). For example 1_30_2 means alarm rate
30 displayed in categorical alarm window tested for age group above 40 years of age.
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